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ABSTRACT
An implicit rationale for a bank reserve requirement isthat
a central monetary authority is in a unique position (as "social
planner) to impose a "socially superior" outcome to that yielded
by a free banking system. We illustrate how this can be true in
the context of a simple economy modeled to mimic certainbasic
characteristics of a monetary economy with banks andagents who
trade with one another. Banks exist in our model becauseby
pooling liquidation risks they provide liquidity otherwise
unavailable to depositors, which, in turn, provides the incentive-
forusing deposit claims as the medium of exchange.
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Recent deregulation of certain aspects of the banking industry has
rekindled debate on the pros and cons of free versus regulatedbanking, and
renewed Interest in questions about the optimality of banking restrictions.'
This paper focuses on the optimality of but one of these restrictions--bank
reserve requirements. An implicit rationale for a bank reserve requirement Is
that a central monetary authority is in a unique position (as 'social
planner) to impose a socially superior outcome to that yielded by a free
banking system. We illustrate how this can be true in the context of a simple
economy modeled to mimic certain basic characteristics of a monetary economy
with banks and agents who trade with one another. Banks exist in our model
because by pooling liquidation risks they provide liquidity otherwise
unavailable to depositors, which, in turn, provides the incentive forusing
deposit claims as the medium of exchange.
One argument for government intervention in banking stresses the
instability due to bank runs caused by depositors' withdrawing deposits
because of fear of other depositors' withdrawing. Dybvig and Diamond(1983)
argue that government deposit insurance can eliminate this instability.
Another argument for intervention, particularly the imposition ofreserve
requirements, emphasizes the role of asymmetric information which leads banks
to pursue different objectives than depositors --see,for example, King
(1983) and Cothren (1987). We abstract from both the problem of bank runs and
of asynmietric information whereby one agent is able to exploit an Information
advantage over another. In our model, there is a Nash equilibrium where each
bank behaves in the best interest of its depositors given the behavior of
other banks. Our analysis focuses on the way individual bank reserves affect
the return and risk associated with bank investments and how this2
return and risk affects the extent of trading among agents --thatis, the
level of economic activity. At this Nash equilibrium a free banking system
can yield a suboptimal outcome according to certain welfare criteria.
That free banking may be suboptimal hinges on a tension between behavior
that is optimal before the realization of a random shock and that which is
optlma afterward. This tension is most easily demonstrated if agents are jj
expectedutility maximizers; therefore we consider such agents in our
analysis. However, this tension arises in general equilibrium models where
agents are expected utility maximizers and thus our results are of a more
general interest. For example, see Lucas (1977), Muench (1977), Polemarchakis
and Weiss (1977), and Azariadis (1981).
In section II we describe the economy's agents, production and trading
technology, preferences, and the nature of equilibrium. Section III describes
the economy's banks and the determination of optimal bank reserves. Section
IV describes the search decision involved in trade. In section V we
demonstrate that there is a tension in this model between optimizing ex post,
conditional utility (conditional on the realization of certain random
variables) versus optimizing ex ante, unconditional utility. Section VI
examines the competitive, Nash equilibrium that arises in our economy.
Section VII concludes the paper by discussing the implications of our analysis
for the optimality of a reserve requirement.
II. The Model
Before filling in the details a brief overview of the model is helpful.
There are three agent types in the economy: banks, type A individuals, and
type B Individuals. The economy evolves through three discrete time periods.3
Each type A agent lives for the first two periods, is endowed with one unit of
a homogenous good, and wishes to consume one unit of a labor service in period
two. Each type B agent lives for three periods, wishes to consume the type
A's goods in period three, and is capable of providing an indivisible unit of
labor in period two.2 These facts provide a motive for trade between A and B
agents in period two; however, trades are executed only after costly search by
type B agents. To simplify the analysis we assume there are N type A and N
type B agents.
There is an investment technology whereby the endowment good of a type A
agent can be invested in period one to yield like goods in period three. As
the type A agents will not be alive in period three, they will either trade or
liquidate their Investments in period two; but liquidation is subject to a
cost. Trading is preferable to liquidation. However some known fraction of
type A agents, unable to trade, will be forced to consume their own goods in
period two rather than labor services. They must incur the liquidation cost.
This fact explains why there is a role for banks. A bank, exploiting the law
of Urge numbers by pooling deposits in period one and through its knowledge
of the fraction of type A's forced to liquidate, can eliminate any liquidation
costs by holding some deposits in reserve.
-
Inthe remainder of this section assumptions concerning type A and B
agents are laid out and the nature of equilibrium is characterized when there
are no banks. In the next section banks are introduced.
Tvue A and B individuals: Each type A is endowed with a unit (a bushel, say)
of oats at the beginning of period one. Type A's live in periods one and two
and consume only in the second. Each type B is endowed with a unit of labor4
service, lives three periods, and consumes only inperiod three. There are an
equal number N of A's and B's.
ftQductlpn. Trading, and Information Assumptions
aj.:In period one the ith type A Individual (iI,...,N) chooses to
invest 9e[O,I} of the endowment unit of oats;i9 is stored costlessly; the
endowment good cannot be invested after period one. Eachtype B must decide
in period one whether to search for a type Atrading partner n period two. A
fraction y of type B's will decide to search, depending on each B's
fixed search cost x (measured in foregone utility).3 Thecost x, xE[O,), is
independently distributed across type B agents according to the cumulative
distribution F(x) and each B's x is revealed to him inperiod one.
AZ:Thefraction 9 of a type A's endowment unit invested in periodone
yields a net return 81r3 in period three, wherer3 is a random variable given
by
r3m1 +(3 (1)
where the random variablesm1 and c are realized in periods one and three,
are distributed independently with means th1 and 0 and variances and A2
respectively. The realization of m1 is known to type A agents in periodone,
but it is only made known in period jy to thosetype B agents who have
incurred the cost of search. The realization of is known to type B agents
in period three when investments reach fruition.5
M: in period two a type A may liquidate his investment 9 and obtain
(i-c)01 where c is the liquidation cost per unit of liquidated investment
(O<ccI). While the fraction lU of a type A's endowment not invested in
period one can be stored costlessly for consumption In a later period, it
cannot be invested after period one.
Al: In period two each searching type B views m1 and each type A'sO.
Each B selects a type A trading partner given the matches of all others.
Labor being Indivisible, each type A who is paired with a type B trades his
entire portfolio, consisting of the fraction (i-Ui) of the unit of A's oats
endowment uninvested pflj the fraction U, invested, for a type B's unit of
labor. The type A's who are paired each consume one unit of labor service and
no oats in period two, realizing a value of 0. The remaining type A's (those
not paired) must each Uquidate their investment, incurring liquidation costc
per unit. They each consume the portion (i-c)81 of the unit of oats endowment
retrieved from investment plus the portion i0 that was initially stored,
realizing a value £ per unit of endowment good consumed, 6<0.
M: Letting p(O) equal the probability that a type A with 0=0 will
execute a trade of his portfolio for one unit of a type B's labor in period
two, and assuming type A's are expected value maximizers, a type A will invest
U=0 in period one only if
p(0)0 +(I-p(Q))(1-c0)6>6 . (2)
Ak: A type B agent who decides not to search for a type A trading
partner will be autarkic, consuming his own labor service, realizing zero6
utility. A type B agent who decides to search wishes toconsume oats in
period three, obtained in trade from a type A in period two.The utility from
Consuming oats in period three, evaluated at any previousperiod, will depend
on the mean and variance of the period three consumption evaluatedas of the
Drevious period. Specifically, if in period j(jJor 2) a type B's period thr
consumption has mean j and variance a1 his utility is
U(p11c/} =- ka-X (3)
where k is a constant greater thanzero, and x is the cost of search defined
in AL4
Theessence of the decision process embodied in AI-A6 above can be
suimtarized as follows.
Step 1:in period one, not yet knowingm1, B's decide whether to search
for a type A trading partner in period two.
Step 2: in period one A's observem1 and then choose 0.
Spi: in period two searching B's observe them1 realization and
select A's on the basis of their knowledge of each A'sO.
We will now anticipate and sketch out the resultson the existence and
characterization of equilibrium which are formally spelled out inthe
propositions to follow. Type A's and B's have rationalexpectations; each
knows the other's utility function and all functionscharacterizing the model.
The determination of optimal behavior is illustratedby considering steps 1-3
in reverse order. At step 3 the D's will choose thoseA's having the most
favorable values of 8. At step 2, observing them1 realization the A's choose
the 8 value optimal for the B's in period two because A'santicipate the B's
subsequent optimal behavior. Thus there is a specific function ofm1, 8(m1),7
that gives the optimal U from the standpoint of the B's. This function will
govern the behavior of the A's at step 2. At step I, the B's are able to
anticipate the optimal behavior of the A's and, of course, their own optimal
behavior at step 3 when they will know the m1 realization and choose type A
trading partners. This means that at step 1 B's are able to calculate the
9(m1) function and use it to determine whether to search. This precisely
determines y, the fraction of B's who decide to search, and allows the A's,
anticipating the optimal behavior of the 8's, to determine the value of p(9)
in (2).In equilibrium each A selects the same value of 8 so p(8) y.
Proposition 1:The fraction of type B's choosing to search is
y =F(k),where from (3)
XEjL1-ku. (4)
Proof: From Al the cost of search x is distributed with function F.
Since a type B will search based upon information available to himself as
of period one (see Al and A2) a type B will search if and only if x ￿u1
-ka,
that is, if and only if the cost of search is less than or equal to the
utility gain. Since this Inequality holds for a fraction F() of type
B's the proposition is proven. Q.E.0.
Since It is not necessary to the argument at this point, we defer
explicit calculation of p1 and auntil (10) and (11) below.
The Search Process and Equilibrium
In period two the yN type B's (recall from Al) who have decided to
search are randomly ordered at the entrance to the trading ground where the H8
type A's are assembled, each displaying his value of 8 (l-1,...,N) selected
in period one (from Al) conditional on the realization ofm1 (from A2). The
type B's enter the trading ground in turn. Upon entry a type B observes the
realization of m1, m1, and all the 0,'s. Each type B, given the matches ofall
preceding B's, will select from the remaining unmatched A's that type A
offering the best available portfolio (conditional on m3. This leads to
Lenuiia 1.
Lemma 1: Type A's who choose to Invest will select 0 — 9', that value
of 9, given m1=m1, maximizing the type B's period two utility. Thatis, given
m1, 9 is selected to maximize,
U(p2ta) = 01[m'- k01)!] -x (5)
Proof: That (5) is period 2 utility follows from (3) and A2 with j=2.
As in AS above, let p(9) be the probability of atype A with 0=0 making a
match. A type A will select 9=9 only if p(9)>O (seeequation 2). Suppose
p(9)>O for some 9<9'. Then clearly p(0)>p(9), since each type B will select
the best available match. Thus no type A will select 0,—flU'.By a similar
argument no type A will select 0>0'. Q.E.D.
Let ,N￿ R,bethe number of type A's who choose U, = 1.Iet
EyN1the number of type B's who search, recalling that there are Ntype
A's and H type B's. There will always besome type B's who don't search, that
is N >II'since search cost x€[O,co). The trading equilibrium in period two is





and let N' —mm(N,fi). The economy characterized by assumptions AI-A6 hasa
unique equilibrium such that N' A's choose Ui —0',N -N'A's choose 6 —0
(i.e., they store), and N ￿ N' M'.
Proof: Since 6 <0,Rsolving(6) exists. At p(6') —, typeA's are
a
indifferentbetween investing or not, Thus if N >, notall type A's will
choose to invest 8 6', since the probability of a trade, M
,whenall A's
N
invest is Insufficient to offset the probable cost of liquidation ofan
investment. In this case N-a A's will not invest andwill. The former
have a zero probability of making a trade, the latter a probability
M
The utility of each type A is 6.If i￿N all type A's invest 8',
N
because the probability of any one making a trade is and the left
N
side of (6) is greater than the right for N'. Q.E.0.
Corollary: If NN' then p(U) in (2) equals y of Proposition 1,
while if N >N'then p equals .!L> .1f= y.
N' N
Proof: The proof is immediate from (2), (6), and Propositions
1 and 2.
Q.E.D.
Henceforth we will assume for simplicity and without loss of
generality that N-tC so that (2) and (6) become
yD +(1-y)(I-cO')6￿ 6. (7)I0
The left side of (7) indicates that a fraction y of the type A's and y of the
type B's (all B's who search) will be matched and make a trade at the trading
ground in period two. A fraction l-y of the type A's assembled at the trading
ground will not be matched and therefore must consume their endowment, equal
the fraction I-B' that was stored plus the fraction Ithatwas invested in
period one but now must be liquidated at liquidation cost c per unit.
Table 1 summarizes our discussion of the world without banks by
itemizing the sequence of events along the time line. The reader will find it
helpful to reexamine the story as summarized in Table 1 before proceeding.
III. Banks
We now introduce banks into this economy. Before proceeding in detail,
a brief sketch of the role and reason for banks is helpful. Banks can provide
the same storage and Investment service to type A agents as an individual type
A can provide for himself, but in addition can provide liquidity.5 This
liquidity is available because a bank through its ability to pool deposits can
avoid the liquidation cost described in assumption A3. Thus in period one a
type A agent has an incentive to deposit his unit endowment of oats in any
bank that will invest 8' and store 1-9' of it. The type A can then trade the
deposit slip to a searching type B at the trading ground in period two for B's
labor service. However if the type A is among the u-WA'swho are not
matched with a searching B in period two, the A can withdraw his entire
deposit from the bank without the liquidation cost cO' otherwise incurred if
he had not used a bank- -hence the incentive for type A's to deposit in a bank.11
Table I
aS-cd e 1'sk k
Per.1 -. )4_.Fr.2—__>..ç —Pe3
a. Each type A endowed with unit of good. Each type U endowed with
unit of labor service.
b. Each type B draws search cost x from F(x) distribution.
c. Each type B calculates utility as of period one, U(ji, a ). Those
type B's with U(p1, a )- x￿ 0, decide to search in next period.
d. Realization in1ofrandom return variable m1 occurs and is
observed by type A's, but not by B's.
e. Given in;,eachtype A makes investment decision by choosing a
value of 9.
f. Type B's who search cue up at entrance to trading ground and
observe in:.Type A's assemble at trading ground, each displaying
his chosen C
g. Type B's enter the trading ground sequentially. Each chooses that (as
yet unchosen) type A displaying a 0 which gives the type U the highest
period two utility U(p2, a ),givenm; -
h. Type A's and B's matched at g now trade. Type A's not matched
liquidate the portion of their endowment good unit invested and
consume that, net of liquidation cost, plus the portion stored.
I. Type A's die.
j. Realization (3ofrandom return variable (3occursand is observed
by type B's each of whom now consumes a unit of the endowment good
nlsiaitsrealized return r3 in:+
k. Type B's die.12
Searching type B's each having acquired a deposit claim (slip) through trade in
period two, withdraw and consume the deposit in period three--the 1-9' of the unit
endowment stored plus the fruition of the 8 portion invested. Competition among
banks forces each bank to choose 8 since this value for 8 win maximize a
depositor's probability of making a trade with a type B. In equilibrium type A's
deposit only In banks that invest Ibecausesearching type B's at the trading
ground will select only those A's holding deposit slips with a 0' on them. We now
elaborate on this scenario, beginning with a description of banks.
fil:Asingle bank can costlessly service a fraction z of the economy's N type
A depositors. The marginal cost of' servicing depositors beyond z is infinite. The
banking service is provided in a competitive market with free entry so banks will
earn zero profits.
: Given its period one deposits from type A's, each bank determines its
reserve policy in period one given knowledge of y and of the realization m1 of n11,
and given the fraction of type B searchers (see Proposition I) and hence the
fraction of type A depositors who are matched with type B's in period two. This
period one reserve decision by a bank is analogous to the type A's period one choice
of 6 in the world without banks.
H:Banksare assumed to be mutually owned ("mutuals") by depositors and are
liquidated In period three." A type A's bank deposit in a representative bank can
be viewed as an equity claim. These claims or "deposit slips" can be traded to type
B's who claim the period three gross investment proceeds of the invested endowment
goad backing each deposit, or they can be "liquidated" by a non-trading type A13
In period two. To this extent equity claims are also a medium of exchange similar
to a redeemable bank note issued by a privately owned competitive bank.
Type A's will choose to deposit their unit endowment in a bank in period one,
rather than invest it on their own, ii banks can reduce or eliminate the liquidation
cost c (incurred by those type A's who are not matched with a type B trading partner
in period two) without lowering a type A's probability of being matched with
a type B. from 61 it follows that in a competitive equilibrium 1/i banks can
provide services to N type A agents at no cost and at no profit to themselves.
Given 62 a bank can exploit the law of large numbers to hold at least a fraction 1-y
of its deposits in storage to accomodate withdrawals In period two by the fraction
!-y of type A depositors who are not matched with type B traders. In this way
investment liquidation costs are eliminated. Since the banking service will be
provided at zero cost and banks will earn zero profits, the savings in liquidation
costs can be passed on to the type A depositors. These savings induce type A
depositors to utilize the banking service, since with c=O a type A's prospects given
by (7) are increased.' The remaining fraction y of deposit claims will be redeemed
in period three by type 0 agents who will have acquired them at the trading ground
in period two in exchange for their labor services.In sum, banks exist because
they eliminate liquidation costs by pooling the risks that type A's may not make a
trade with a type B.
Proposition 3: Given that each bank will hold a fraction 1-y of its deposits
in reserve to cover period two withdrawals, let 1-6 of the remaining fraction also
be held in reserve and $ invested. Then each deposit claim held until period three
by type B agents, conditional on the realization m of m1, will have a mean net rate
of return and variance as of period two of
On: (8)14
022— 02)! (9)
Proof: Since banks provide their services at zero cost and earn zero profits
(from 81), the return from investments will accrue to depositors. Since period two
withdrawals yield no met return the total return on Investment will be distributed
to claim holders In period three. It follows from A2 and (I) that, conditional on
m3, the mean and variance of this return are given by (8) and (9). Q.E.D.
The next proposition and proof show how and why banks assure that a type A's
probability of being matched with a type 8 Is the same whether the type A uses a
bank or invests on his own.
Pronositlon 4: Given y and conditional on n1, in period one each bank
will select B —0'to maximize the period two utility of type B's, -ka
-
where$2 and o are given by equations (8) and (9).(Recall the maximizing
value 0 is conditional on m1, 9—9(m1).
Proof: The crucial fact here is that the banking industry is
competitive (81).In a competitive market, each bank will attract customers
in period one by offering type A's the best possible chance of making a trade
at the trading ground in period two. As follows from Lema I, this means
each bank selects 9 —= 0(m1)to maximize u2kc$
-x,given m1, where izand
2 are given by (8) and (9) (see (5)). Q.E.D.
IV. The Search Decision
We now specify p and c, the mean and variance of a type A's period three
consumption calculated as of period one. These values enter (4) of Proposition I to15
determine the fraction y of type B's who decide in period one to search in period
two.
Proposition 5: The value attached to a deposit claim by a type B agent





- + F,($(m3)2A (11)
where 6(m1) is defined in Proposition 4, and Em is the expectation operator
over m1.
Proof:If acquired, the type B agent will hold a deposit claim until
period three. The mean net return is E(9(m1))(m1÷c1) (from Al, A2 and
Proposition 4). TakIng the expected value of this first over c and then
m1 yields p above. The variance of this return is V[O(m1)(m1+c)]
V[m19(mjl + V[c39(m1)] + 2Cov[m10(m1), c10(m1j1, which is a12 from the fact
that p is as given and that in1 and £3 are independently distributed (see
A2). Q.E.D.
Table 2 summarizes our discussion of the world with banks by indicating
where events along the time line of Table 1 (world without banks) are changed
as a consequence of the introduction of banks. The reader should closely
compare Tables I and 2.16
Table 2
a b-z, Jd'€ 9 1 1 .5 .I•I p • p S S •——----——
Pej— ->..c.-...—gp,2--—•--.c--- ___
a. Same as Table 1.
b. Same as Table 1.
C. Sameas Table 1.
d. Same as Table I except m also observed by banks.
d: Type A's deposit endowment good in banks.
e Each bank puts fraction 1-Cy of its deposits in reserve and,
given m ,InvestsDy.
f. Same as Table I except each A displays deposit ticket marked
with 9 chosen by bank.
g. Same as Table I.
h. Same as Table I except type A's not matched withdraw deposit
of endowment good (with no liquidation cast) and consume it.
i. Same as Table 1.
j. Same as Table I except Type B's withdraw deposit from bank
and consume it (endowment good plus realized return).
k. Same as Table I.17
V. Lx ante versus Lx oost ODtimlzation
There Is an obvious distinction between type B's utility in period one,
given by (3) (with i—i), (10) and (11). determined ex ante B's observation of
m1, and type B's period two utility, given by (3) (with J—2), (8) and (9), e.
thesearch decision, and B's observation of m1. This raises an
interesting question. Is it possible that a bank's setting of 0=8' accordIng
to Proposition I to maximize type B's period two utility is not optimal from
the vantage point of type B's period one utility? This question is of
interest because the number of type B searchers is determined by a type B's
period one utility according to Proposition I, while by Proposition 4 banks
are compelled by competition to maximize a type B's period two utility. If
maximizing period two utility does not maximize period one utility then there
may be a sub-optimal number of type B searchers. The following example
demonstrates that this can be the case under certain conditions,
First of all, note that the mean-variance tradeoff (the slope of the
opportunity locus) available to a bank in period two by its selection of 8
conditional on m1 (i.e. ex rrnst the realization m1 of m1), is, from (8) and (9)
dp2 di2 do 114
—=————n-.-—— . (12)
dadO da 26)?
Examples of such loci are given by Oa and Gb in Figure 1, where Gb corresponds
to a higher value of m1 than Oa, and the endpoints a and b correspond to zero
reserves, 8 =1,in excess of I-y. Second, note that each type B has linear
indifference curves with slope k in mean-variance space (given by equation
(3)) --suchas U, and Ub in Figure I. Now consider the following assumption.18









The condition (14) implies that a type B's period twoutility is
maximized when banks choose 0=1 regardless of m11s value --thatIs, when
banks hold zero reserves in excess of 1-y. This case is illustratedin Figure
1 where the bank opportunity locus associated withm1 —ais Oa, and the
maximum type B period two utility level U, is attained at theendpoint of the
bank opportunity locus, point a, corresponding toa zero level of reserve
holdings. Recognizing that when 8—1 condition (14) is true a fortiorl for all
>a,it follows that a type B's period two utility is maximized forall m1
e [a,fl) when banks chose hi. For example, the slope of theopportunity locus
Oh corresponding to anm1 >ais steeper at point b than the slope of Oa at
point a.
Now to see that 6=1 may not maximize type B's periodone utility. First
suppose that U is a constant, the same for all banks and all m1ts as in the
case under consideration. Then assuming type B's form theirperiod one'9
expectations rationally to obtain p1 and o according to (10) and (ii),
IS,— $1111 (10')
and
a,t $2A2 + E[8m,-6j12
or
+ c4] , (11')
where i, and a are respectively the mean and variance of m1. The period




The period one opportunity locus is shown as Oc in Figure 2. Evaluating
(15) at 0—i reveals that
_________k (15')
2(A2+c1)
Comparing (14) and (15') it is clear that it is possible for the period one
opportunity locus to be less steeply sloped at its endpoint, point c where
8=1, than Is the case for the period two opportunity locus. In this event the20
period one utility level will not be maximized when 0=1, as illustrated in
Figure 2, since the level of utility U (given by (3), (10) and (11))
associated with the indifference curve passing through point c is lower than
the maximum attainable level U associated with the indifference curve passing
through point d.8 This discussion culminates in the following proposition and
corollary.
Proposition 6: Given Assumption H, If
flu
_______a (16)
0=1 2)! 2(A2+aJ )da 0=1
then a type B's period one utility is maximized when 9=9', where 1>81)0 solves
da 20'(A2+a)
and period two utility is maximized at 0=1.
Proof: Given inequality (16) and equation (15), such a 0' will exist
and is optimal ex ante (i.e. in period one) since at 0', a type D's
indifference curve will be just tangent to the mean-variance locus. That ex
post (i.e. in period two) utility is optimized at 0=1 follows from the above
discussion. Q.E.0.21
Corollary: Given Assumption M, equation (15), andinequality (16), a
requirement that 8—0' will also maximize the period one utility oftype A
agents, given by (2) of AS, as well as the period one utility oftype B
agents.
Proof: Requiring that 0=0' maximizes the period oneutility of type B's
and hence will maximize the probability of a type B'ssearching given by
y—F(i), equations (4), (10'), and (11'). Since theprobability that a type A
executes a trade is p ￿ y by the corollary to Proposition 2, to maximizey is
to maximize the utility of type A's given by (2) of AS. Q.E.D.
The requirement that 0=0' is of course a binding constraint because
1>8'O, while banks would prefer to choose 0=1. This is equivalent to a
reserve requirement of 1-y+y(1-0')=l-yG' since banks know that 1-y will be
withdrawn in period two by non-trading type A's.
VI. The Nash Eoujlibrium
Why don't individual banks choose to hold the level of reserves
corresponding to the maximization of the type B's period one utility at point
d in Figure 2? Certainly if all banks did so it would increase the chances of
their type A depositors making trades as demonstrated by the corollary to
Proposition 6. However no single bank will hold reserves to maximize a type
B's period one utility if all others are doing so.
To see why, suppose that all banks other than bank i are holding
reserves in excess of 1-y (i.e., 0' >0)to maximize a type B's period one22
utility, corresponding to point d in Figure 2 for period one utility, and d in
Figure 1 for period two utility. Then in this case, since bank i's behavior
has no impact on the period one search decision of type B agents, bank i will
select its portfolio to maximize a type B's period two utility (i.e., choose B
=0)given by point a or b (depending upon the realization of m1) in Figure 1.
Bank I will do this because it increases to one the probability that each of
its depositors will make a trade --thebank can extract more than a
competitive equilibrium normal profit from this situation. This follows since
if all other banks offer a lower period two utility, such as point d inFigure
1, then at the trading ground searching type B's will prefer to trade with
bank l's type A depositors.9 The conclusion is that banks' choosing to
optimize period one type B utility is not an equilibrium. Clearly the Nash
equilibrium is for all banks to maximize period two type B utility. Although
all banks might agree to maximize period one type B utility and hence maximize
the number of traders, in the absence of some kind of enforcement mechanism
this agreement would not be time consistent. Ofcourse, type B agents
recognize this fact and always search for type A's who deposit at banks which
maximize their period two utility; type B's know such search will be
successful.
VII. The Optimality of a Reserve Requirement'°
The simplistic economy we have modeled above is intended to mimic
certain basic characteristics of a monetaryeconomy with banks and agents who23
trade. The banks provide liquidity otherwise unavailable to depositors.This
in turn necessitates the use of deposit claims as the medium ofexchange when
type A depositors buy labor services from type B's; deposit claims are
willingly accepted by type B's precisely because they represent a claim on the
period three proceeds of an invested endowment good which a type B wants to
consume. Thus in this economy the existence of banks and deposit claims
serving as money increases welfare by eliminating the liquidation costs
otherwise incurred by type A's who are unable to execute a trade with atype B
in period two.
Within this framework we have seen that under certain conditions (given
by Proposition 6 and its corollary) the imposition of a reserve requirement
unambiguously increases the welfare of type A individuals. The reserve
requirement also increases period one utility U(gi1, ,2) for all type B's at
point c in Table 2. Given the drawing of the search cost x at point c in
period one, some type B's will still decide not to search (those drawing the
highest x's, since xc[O,m)). but the number of these will be less than in the
absence of a reserve requirement. Some type B's who decide not to search when
there is no reserve requirement will decide to search when the requirement is
imposed. And finally, some type B's (those drawing the lowest x's) will
decide to search under either regime. Thus in period one at point c, Table 2,
some type B's are better off and none are worse off with the imposition of the
reserve requirement.
Consider the effect of the reserve requirement on agents in period two.
More type A's will make trades with type B's than when there is no requirement24
--hencesome type A's are better off and none are worse off. Type B's who
would trade in a regime without reserve requirements are worse off ina regime
with reserve requirements for every realization ofm1: judged by period one
utility the reserve requirement makes this group better off, but worse off
according to period two utility. What is the "appropriateTM welfare criterion?
There is no unambiguous answer to this question. As tucas (1977,p. 352) has
noted in a similar context, "The optimality criterion one should adopt is, of
course, a controversial issue, one which cannot be settled by unsupported
assertions as to what is 'the only appropriate criterion'."" Our own
preference is to judge according to period one utility, that is, when agents
confront the most uncertainty about the world at the very beginning. By this
criterion the reserve requirement Is unambiguously welfare improving.
We have dwelled on the case where a reserve requirement Is welfare
improving, given the conditions of Proposition 6 and its corollary. However,
it should be emphasized by way of conclusion that if these conditions don't
hold then a reserve requirement reduces welfare.25
footnotes
1. See, for example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Fama (1980),King (1983),
Rolrilck and Weber (1983), White (1984), and Cothren(1985, 1987).
2. The assumption of two types of Individuals with differentlifespans, one
living two periods and the other three, is not new. Diamond and
Dybvlg (1983) make the same assumption. In their three period model
Individuals do not know which type they are going to be until thesecond
period; here individuals know which type they are In the firstperiod.
3. The cost of search may be simply thought of as theaggravation of
search.
-
4. The type B agent is not an expected utility maximizer. Thelinearity of
U is for convenience. A more general specification is possible without
voiding the results to follow.
5. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Cothren (1987) also model bankdeposits
as deposits of goods. Of course, in reality bank deposits are assets
that can be converted into consumable goods subject to uncertainty
as to the exchange ratio. Modeling deposits as goods themselves then
is a simplifying assumption that is not a distortion of reality
when the deposit/good exchange ratio is stable as is the case here.
This is the same as the story about how goldsmiths accepted gold
as deposits and issued deposit claims thereby becoming bankers --a
story often told in elementary textbooks when describing the origin
of banks.
6. Diamond and Dybvig (1983, p. 408) also assume their banks are
mutual s.7. It Is not necessary to pass the entire cost saving on to type A's.
Any reduction in c would Induce them to deposit in banks. For
simplicity we assume the entire saving is passed on to the type A's.
8. The restriction that 9(m)—I for all m can be relaxed. Details
are available upon request.
9. Recall that by assumption Al the endowment good can only be
invested in period one as it takes three periods for the investment
to come to fruition. Therefore banks must make their decision
about 9 -.howmuch of the fraction (1-y) to invest --inperiod one.
10. It is often argued that a principal reason for a mandatory reserve
requirement is that it gives the Fed control over the money supply.
However such an argument does not negate the fact that imposition
of a reserve requirement affects the risk-return trade-off of a
bank's asset portfolio, the focus of this analysis.
11. Although our agents are not expected utility maximizers, the
tension between the period one-period two utility criteria need
not hinge on this fact. In general equilibrium models, such
tension can also arise in the context of expected utility
analysis, as has been illustrated, for example, in the exchange
between Lucas (1977), Muench (1977), and Polemarchakis and
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